Can Multiculturalism co-exist with Individual Human Rights?

Multiculturalism is considered one of the basic markers of a liberal democracy. The promotion of diversity as a primary component of liberty has existed since conception of the U.S. constitution.  Liberalism as it is understood, within the framework of liberal democracies, has evolved and can be assessed as having nuanced and differing definitions. However, the general trend within scholarly circles concerning the definition and the principles of liberalism can be divided into two groups. The first school of thought understands liberalism as a dyad of political and moral philosophy. This idea while having roots in ancient Greek thinkers was explicitly addressed in the works of John Rawls’s seminal work called “Political Liberalism” which addressed some of the flaws of his initial theory of justice[1].  Rawls’s understanding of liberalism within the framework of the state can be assessed as “thin liberalism”, which came under scrutiny from Michael Sandel and Susan Okin who posited the idea of a more comprehensive liberalism[2], or “thick liberalism”. Martha Nassbaum who advocated a “thin liberal” position argued that in the case of conflicting values, the political liberals should promote a fair balance in each particular case[3], as opposed to having individual or gender equality be an outright determinant of justice within a liberal framework of state. So as we can see there are some legitimate disagreements among scholars in how to address this friction of group rights, vs individual rights and what should take precedence, just within the liberal camps. And the introduction of multiculturalists like Will Kymlicka who viewed this specific issue in his studies of multicultural societies like Canada and Switzerland, added another dimension to this debate. Kymlicka agrees on principle that there needs to be more scrutiny into intra-cultural rights of groups that live under the umbrella of liberal democracies, but use that protection to propagate illiberal customs to its own members. But Kymlicka departs from the notion that individual right trumps all groups rights (as suggested by the comprehensive liberal camps), and proposes a notion of differentiating and dissecting group rights and providing a framework for them to exist within liberal democracies that will indeed help create a more inclusive conception of justice[4].

As a practical matter of human rights, if group rights are in direct violation of individual rights, should that group right be protected under the constitutional framework of a liberal democracy, that value diversity and multiculturalism? This very important question has raised a lot of intellectual debate among scholars, and has shed light on illiberal practices from ethnic and religious minorities like Mormons for prescribing to polygamy or certain Muslim cultures that prescribe to female circumcision. Theorists like Leslie Green has suggested that it is not possible to accommodate group right, even if the individual can exit a specific group, because the cost of exiting such a group would in effect make the individual suffer to great extent. Green uses the example of Mormon women and polygamy to state that the internal group rights are in effect unjust and cannot be reconciled within liberal democratic norms of individual rights[5]. So despite having the choice to opt out from one specific group, the individual (in this case women) has to bear severe cost. On the other hand tolerating illiberal group practices under the umbrella of multiculturalism is problematic and has serious repercussions for both the state and the individual.

What happens when an individual’s human rights becomes mutually exclusive to a groups right to practice its custom? This multi-layered question can only be addressed through a framework of a constraint-based assessment of group rights. Primarily it can be agreed upon that all rights stem from individual rights[6], but there are distinct ethnic and religious rights that exist only within the conception of group identity. That group identity may include accumulation of individual history and collective understanding of equality and may differ from the individualistic notion of liberty that is so prominent in liberal democracies. The constraint based assessment stems from the idea that minority group customs are protected from the dictation of the majority, but are not protected if it infringes upon personal freedom. This ‘personal freedom’ or ‘personal capability’[7] includes exit from a specific group with limited cost, so if a Mormon woman decides to leave her husband , she will be entitled to benefits like any other person within the society that go through a divorce, and religious protection cannot be extended in matters of individual right. So while a minority group may practice its custom, it may not prohibit anyone to leave their group, either through specific decree or covert inducement that might affect individuals capability or even “substantive freedoms”.

If a minority group were actually under the assumption that the majority groups are trying to infiltrate and debase their religious and ethnic customs, then it would be prudent to set up an honest broker to mitigate the situation. So setting up a human rights commission, or an international body to address minority group rights when it contradicts with majority rights, would be a good way to approach this issue, because it would provide a just avenue to address the issues at hand without the preconception of majority dictating minority custom. Therefore, the decision to accommodate group rights must be taken in two different levels. First and foremost, individual matters of custom and religion, would have to be treated as such, and no protection of group rights should be provided to deter or denigrate an individual’s capability. So divorce, welfare of children, are all matters of the state, not just the minority. Religious and ethnic customs that do not harm the individual and provide an exit to the individual(if they are unhappy), must be protected under the umbrella of liberalism. Despite disagreement between various scholars, it is worth noting that all of them essentially seek the same goal, and that goal is to attain a more inclusive understanding, prescription and implementation of justice. And it will be impossible to attain this goal without constraint-based group rights that does not erode individual rights.

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[1] See, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) for a comprehensive understanding of justice within political process.

[2] Michael Sandel, Liberalism and The Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1988); Susan Moller Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?,” in Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 7-27

[3] See, Martha Nussbaum,“A Plea for Difficulty,” in Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1999), 105-115.

[4] See, Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998. And  Liberal Complacencies : A response to Susan Okin. Boston Book Review. http://www.bostonreview.net/BR22.5/kymlicka.html

[5] See, Leslie Green,. 1995. “Internal Minorities and Their Rights.” In The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka. New York: Oxford University Press.

[6] This idea is entrenched in the writing of Kant and Mill, and has taken a constitutional contextual form through the writings of Locke, and the writers of the U.S. constitution.

[7]See,  Amartya K. Sen ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism’, in The Journal of Philosophy and Development as Freedom, by the Same Author.

© 2010, Jyoti chowdhury. All rights reserved.

Tags: Freedom, group rights, Human Rights, individual rights, justice, kymlicka, liberty, minority, multiculturalism, Rights, sandel, social

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